SNBC 3: What is the outlook?
In mid-July France adopted its third low-carbon national strategy, which sets the trajectory for reducing its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the coming decades, as well as the strategic directions for accelerating the transition to a decarbonised economy. Analysis.
In 2024, France emitted 367 Mt of CO2, with initial estimates putting the figure for 2025 at 360 Mt. The 16 July decree on national carbon budgets and the national low-carbon strategy(1) indicates that the SNBC 3 documents have been adopted (art. 1). It specifies that the carbon budgets (i.e. emission ceilings not to be exceeded) for 2024-2028 and 2029-2033 have been reviewed and set at 342 Mt and 262 Mt of CO2 per year, respectively, and that 194 Mt CO2 per year has been set for the period that follows (2034-2038), excluding carbon sinks (Art. 2). The following articles give the figures by area of activity, regulatory sector, GHG category, and indicative ranges. They also set targets for international transport and for the country’s carbon footprint(2), which must be reduced by 71% to 79% by 2050 compared to 2010 in order to reduce the carbon footprint of each French person to between 2.3 and 3.1 tonnes of CO2.
The different quantified levers
Set at 274 Mt CO2 in 2030, the GHG emissions reference trajectory should be based on 41% for electrification of uses, 15% for biomass, 13% for energy efficiency, 11% for responsible uses, 10% for carbon capture and 10% for low-carbon energy production.
A roadmap to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050
SNBC 3 aims to achieve a large number of reinforced objectives: halve the country’s emissions by 2030 compared to 1990, achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, move away from fossil fuels and ensure energy sovereignty, reduce final energy consumption, consolidate natural carbon sinks (forests, soils, meadows, etc.), ensure a just transition and reduce the country’s carbon footprint.
A precise timeline to phase out fossil fuels
This third version of the SNBC plans to phase out coal electricity production in 2027, phase out crude oil and fossil gas production in the territory in 2040, phase out oil* in 2045 and phase out fossil gas by 2050.
* i.e. consumption
This new strategy organises the decarbonisation of all major sectors of activity – transport, agriculture, industry, construction, energy, waste, natural carbon sinks/LULUCF(3) – and sets short- and medium-term carbon budgets. Quantified objectives, physical objectives and public policy directions to achieve them have been given for each of the sectors (see table “Objectives by sector”). It also sets cross-cutting directions for public services, companies, local authorities, citizens, regional planning, research, employment/training/skills, financing and digital.
Objectives by sector
· The transport sector (125.4 Mt CO2 in 2024) will have to reduce its emissions by 26% in 2030 and reach a level at virtually zero in 2050 compared to 1990 (cf. electrification of the land vehicle fleet, demand management, modal shift, carpooling, rail and river freight, sustainable fuels).
· The agriculture sector (78 Mt CO2 in 2024) will have to reduce its emissions by 26% in 2030 and 53% in 2050 compared to 1990 (cf. reduction in livestock production emissions, reduction in the consumption of nitrogenous mineral fertilisers, decarbonisation of the energy consumption of agricultural machinery and buildings).
· The industrial sector (62 Mt CO2 in 2024) will have to reduce its emissions by 70% in 2030 and by 96% in 2050 vs 1990 (cf. decarbonisation of the energy mix through electrification of uses in particular, decarbonisation of processes, carbon capture).
· The construction sector (56 Mt CO2 in 2024) will have to reduce its emissions by 61% in 2030 and 97% in 2050 vs 1990 (cf. decarbonised heating systems, insulation, energy efficiency, using less).
· The energy sector (31 Mt CO2 in 2024) will have to reduce its emissions by 69% in 2030 and 96% in 2050 vs 1990 (cf. decarbonised electricity production – coal phase out, renewable energy, nuclear; heat, bioenergy and hydrogen production; refining decarbonisation).
· The waste sector (15 Mt CO2 in 2024) will have to reduce its emissions by 28% in 2030 and 55% in 2050 compared to 1990 (cf. reduction in non-hazardous waste storage, biogas capture).
· The LULUCF sector represented a natural carbon sink of -52 Mt CO2 in 2024. It should remain around -33 Mt CO2 in 2030 and -23 Mt CO2 in 2050 (cf. role of reinforced absorption of the forest-wood sector through adaptation, fire defence, implementation of ZAN or even improvement of carbon storage in soils).
· The carbon footprint 'sector' (563 Mt CO2 in 2024) will have to be reduced by 38% to 43% in 2030 and by 71% to 79% in 2050 (cf. change in production and consumption modes, strengthening of the carbon adjustment mechanism at borders (MACF), new trade policy, decarbonisation of partners, green reindustrialisation).
· The digital sector (carbon footprint estimated at 29.5 Mt CO2 in 2022) is expected to double by 2050. The objective is to contain this increase by targeting between -15% and +12% in 2030 vs 2022 and, by 2050, between stability and a reduction compared to 2022.
What is the strategic environmental assessment of SNBC 3?
The Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the new SNBC concluded that it has “overall positive or neutral effects on the environment”. However, it identified several points of vigilance. These include, in particular, the increased need for metals and critical materials for low-carbon technologies, potential local pressures on the water resources(4), increased competition on land uses (biomass, infrastructure, carbon sinks), risks of local impacts on biodiversity linked to the development of renewable energies and biomass or the increase in certain waste flows (batteries, PV panels, wind turbines, charging stations), which requires reuse and recycling channels to be developed.
In short, SNBC 3 “defined the decarbonisation trajectories of all sectors of the economy while pursuing the objective of strengthening the country’s sovereignty, reducing its dependence on fossil fuels and supporting its companies competitiveness”. During her presentation mid-July, the minister stressed that “the first resolution in the face of climate change remains reducing emissions”. With this in mind, this new strategy must contribute to that. However, even though experts commended her, some consider that more emphasise could have been placed on certain aspects. Several refer to sufficiency above all, a major lever in a decarbonisation perspective. According to CITEPA, other requests made by the Environmental Authority remain inconspicuous in this revised version (e.g.: soil artificialisation trajectory, assumptions relating to farming, gradual withdrawal of fossil fuel financing). Similarly, according to CITEPA, certain points of vigilance raised by the French High Council for Climate in its March 2026 recommendation do not seem to be fully lifted (e.g.: development of a roadmap coordinated with budget planning, definition of total and sectoral targets for 2040, presentation of alternative scenarios in the event of deviation from the planned trajectory).
Reducing our emissions: tangible benefits
In addition to the urgent need to accelerate climate change mitigation, reducing our emissions has benefits in terms of energy sovereignty, economy, biodiversity and health. For example, while France’s energy bill stood at €57.8 billion in 2024 (mainly linked to fossil energy imports), electrifying and decarbonising would save €22 to €39 billion in fossil imports by 2030. Another point according to the ministry is that if decarbonisation will require €80 billion/year of additional gross investment in 2030 compared to 2024*, the economic impact of the low-carbon transition is much lower than the cost of climate inaction, which could reduce GDP by 8.5 points by 2050. At the same time, low-carbon transformation helps preserve biodiversity and water quality by reducing pollution, artificialisation and changes in land use. And the low-carbon transition also reduces the risks associated with climate change as well as air pollution and its effects on health.
*In line with the Stratégie pluriannuelle des financements de la transition écologique (SPAFTE – Multiannual Strategy for Financing the Ecological Transition)
1) Decree No. 2026-636 published in the Journal officiel de la République française (JORF; Official Journal of the French Republic)of 18 July.
2) The carbon footprint covers all emissions related to our consumption, including those of imported products.
3) LULUCF: Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry.
4) In particular for certain industrial sectors but also for carbon capture and storage.